Zählt nur der Eigennutz? Was den Menschen antreibt
Interessierte Hörerinnen und Hörer finden auf dieser Seite weiterführende Informationen zu den einzelnen Sendungsthemen als Zusatzmaterial.
Die Materialien wurden zum Zugriffszeitpunkt 25.01.2016 erstellt von:
Prof. Dr. Michael Kosfeld, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main
Folge 10 zum Nachhören und Herunterladen
Zusatzmaterialien als PDF zum Herunterladen
Übersicht
1. Altruismus versus Egoismus
2. Kooperationsexperiment
3. Forschungspapiere
3.1 Ultimatum Spiel
3.2 Kooperation / Reziprozität
3.3 Vertrauen
3.4 Kooperationsverhalten von jungen Menschen und Schimpansen
3.5 Neuroökonomie
1. Altruismus versus Egoismus
„Erst kommt das Fressen, dann die Moral“, stellte Bertolt Brecht so anklagend wie resignierend fest. Wer kennt das nicht: Den Sturmlauf aufs Buffet, wenn die Hühnerkeulen auszugehen drohen. Bislang bestand kaum Zweifel, dass der Mensch ein egoistischer Raffzahn ist. Die Finanzkrise scheint dieses Menschenbild gerade wohl zu bestätigen. An der Börse wird gezockt bis zum Abwinken, ohne Rücksicht auf Verluste. Die Verlierer campen auf der Straße und fordern Fairness und Solidarität. Gutmenschen vs. Egoisten? Arm gegen Reich? Macht gegen Moral?
Forschungsergebnisse aus den unterschiedlichsten wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen zeichnen in ihrem Zusammenwirken ein anderes Menschenbild: Der Mensch als soziales Wesen, das Werten wie Großzügigkeit und Gerechtigkeit den Vorzug vor schierem Eigennutz gibt. Doch wie passt dieses Bild in den Kontext unserer bestehenden gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Strukturen? Ganz nah dran am Puls der Zeit erforschen wir Zusammenhänge, die auf den ersten Blick unfassbar scheinen. Wir werfen einen interdisziplinären Blick auf die Befunde, die das „Gute“ im Menschen beweisen sollen und fragen nach dem Sinn altruistischen Verhaltens im Kampf ums Überleben. Wir nehmen den Zuschauer mit auf sein ganz persönliches Abenteuer, an dessen Ende er sich selber fragt, wie viel Altruismus wohl in ihm steckt.
Quelle: „Altruismus versus Egoismus“, ARD alpha, 2014.
Link: http://www.br.de/fernsehen/ard-alpha/sendungen/altruismus-egoismus/altruismus-egoismus-100.html
2. Kooperationsexperiment
Frankfurter Labor für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung
Auf den folgenden Seiten finden Sie ein examplarisches Experiment zum Thema Kooperation, wie es Verhaltensökonomen in ihren Studien einsetzen. Sie könnnen das Spiel ohne Anmeldung oder Registrierung ausprobieren.
Link: http://experiment.uni-frankfurt.de/limesurvey/index.php/427894
3. Forschungspapiere
3.1 Ultimatum Spiel
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
There are many experimental studies of bargaining behavior, but suprisingly enough nearly no attempt has been made to investigate the so-called ultimatum bargaining behavior experimentally. The special property of ultimatum bargaining games is that on every stage of the bargaining process only one player has to decide and that before the last stage the set of outcomes is already restricted to only two results. To make the ultimatum aspect obvious we concentrated on situations with two players and two stages. In the ‘easy games’ a given amount c has to be distributed among the two players, whereas in the ‘complicated games’ the players have to allocate a bundle of black and white chips with different values for both players. We performed two main experiments for easy games as well as for complicated games. By a special experiment it was investigated how the demands of subjects as player 1 are related to their acceptance decisions as player 2.
Quelle: Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3(4), 367–388.
Link: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0167268182900117
3.2 Kooperation / Reziprozität
Are people conditionally cooperative?
We study the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant of the strategy-method. We find that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50% are conditional cooperators.
Quelle: Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001). Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters, 71(3), 397–404.
Link: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176501003949
The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions
Understanding the fundamental patterns and determinants of human cooperation and the maintenance of social order in human societies is a challenge across disciplines. The existing empirical evidence for the higher levels of cooperation when altruistic punishment is present versus when it is absent systematically ignores the institutional competition inherent in human societies. Whether punishment would be deliberately adopted and would similarly enhance cooperation when directly competing with nonpunishment institutions is highly controversial in light of recent findings on the detrimental effects of punishment. We show experimentally that a sanctioning institution is the undisputed winner in a competition with a sanction-free institution. Despite initial aversion, the entire population migrates successively to the sanctioning institution and strongly cooperates, whereas the sanction-free society becomes fully depopulated. The findings demonstrate the competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions and exemplify the emergence and manifestation of social order driven by institutional selection.
Quelle: Gürerk, Ö., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B. (2006). The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions. Science, 312, 108–111.
Link: http://science.sciencemag.org/content/312/5770/108.short
Conditional Cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain Success in Forest Commons Management
Recent evidence suggests that prosocial behaviors like conditional cooperation and costly norm enforcement can stabilize large-scale cooperation for commons management. However, field evidence on the extent to which variation in these behaviors among actual commons users accounts for natural commons outcomes is altogether missing. Here, we combine experimental measures of conditional cooperation and survey measures on costly monitoring among 49 forest user groups in Ethiopia with measures of natural forest commons outcomes to show that (i) groups vary in conditional cooperator share, (ii) groups with larger conditional cooperator share are more successful in forest commons management, and (iii) costly monitoring is a key instrument with which conditional cooperators enforce cooperation. Our findings are consistent with models of gene-culture coevolution on human cooperation and provide external validity to laboratory experiments on social dilemmas.
Quelle: Rustagi, D., Engel, S., & Kosfeld, M. (2010). Conditional Cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain Success in Forest Commons Management. Science, 330(6006), 961–965.
Link: http://science.sciencemag.org/content/330/6006/961
3.3 Vertrauen
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
We designed an experiment to study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting. This design controls for alternative explanations of behavior including repeat game reputation effects, contractual precommitments, and punishment threats. Observed decisions suggest that reciprocity exists as a basic element of human behavior and that this is accounted for in the trust extended to an anonymous counterpart. A second treatment, social history, identifies conditions which strengthen the relationship between trust and reciprocity.
Quelle: Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History. Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 122–142.
Link: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825685710275
The Hidden Costs of Control
We analyze the consequences of control on motivation in an experimental principalagent game, where the principal can control the agent by implementing a minimum performance requirement before the agent chooses a productive activity. Our results show that control entails hidden costs since most agents reduce their performance as a response to the principal’s controlling decision. Overall, the effect of control on the principal’s payoff is nonmonotonic. When asked for their emotional perception of control, most agents who react negatively say that they perceive the controlling decision as a signal of distrust and a limitation of their choice autonomy.
Quelle: Falk, A., & Kosfeld, M. (2006). The Hidden Costs of Control. The American Economic Review, 96(5), 1611–1630.
Link: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034987?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
3.4 Kooperationsverhalten von jungen Menschen und Schimpansen
Altruistic Helping in Human Infants and Young Chimpanzees
Human beings routinely help others to achieve their goals, even when the helper receives no immediate benefit and the person helped is a stranger. Such altruistic behaviors (toward non-kin) are extremely rare evolutionarily, with some theorists even proposing that they are uniquely human. Here we show that human children as young as 18 months of age (prelinguistic or just-linguistic) quite readily help others to achieve their goals in a variety of different situations. This requires both an understanding of others‘ goals and an altruistic motivation to help. In addition, we demonstrate similar though less robust skills and motivations in three young chimpanzees.
Quelle: Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Altruistic helping in human infants and young chimpanzees. Science, 311(5765), 1301–1303.
Link: http://science.sciencemag.org/content/311/5765/1301.short
Egalitarianism in young children
Human social interaction is strongly shaped by other-regarding preferences, that is, a concern for the welfare of others. These preferences are important for a unique aspect of human sociality—large scale cooperation with genetic strangers—but little is known about their developmental roots. Here we show that young children’s other-regarding preferences assume a particular form, inequality aversion that develops strongly between the ages of 3 and 8. At age 3–4, the overwhelming majority of children behave selfishly, whereas most children at age 7–8 prefer resource allocations that remove advantageous or disadvantageous inequality. Moreover, inequality aversion is strongly shaped by parochialism, a preference for favouring the members of one’s own social group. These results indicate that human egalitarianism and parochialism have deep developmental roots, and the simultaneous emergence of altruistic sharing and parochialism during childhood is intriguing in view of recent evolutionary theories which predict that the same evolutionary process jointly drives both human altruism and parochialism.
Quelle: Fehr, E., Bernhard, H., & Rockenbach, B. (2008). Egalitarianism in young children. Nature, 454(7208), 1079–1083.
Link: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v454/n7208/abs/nature07155.html
3.5 Neuroökonomie
Oxytocin increases trust in humans
Trust pervades human societies. Trust is indispensable in friendship, love, families and organizations, and plays a key role in economic exchange and politics. In the absence of trust among trading partners, market transactions break down. In the absence of trust in a country’s institutions and leaders, political legitimacy breaks down. Much recent evidence indicates that trust contributes to economic, political and social success. Little is known, however, about the biological basis of trust among humans. Here we show that intranasal administration of oxytocin, a neuropeptide that plays a key role in social attachment and affiliation in non-human mammals, causes a substantial increase in trust among humans, thereby greatly increasing the benefits from social interactions. We also show that the effect of oxytocin on trust is not due to a general increase in the readiness to bear risks. On the contrary, oxytocin specifically affects an individual’s willingness to accept social risks arising through interpersonal interactions. These results concur with animal research suggesting an essential role for oxytocin as a biological basis of prosocial approach behaviour.
Quelle: Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P. Z., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2005). Oxytocin increases trust in humans. Nature, 435(7042), 673–676.
Link: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v435/n7042/abs/nature03701.html
Changing social norm compliance with noninvasive brain stimulation
All known human societies have maintained social order by enforcing compliance with social norms. The biological mechanisms underlying norm compliance are, however, hardly understood. We show that the right lateral prefrontal cortex (rLPFC) is involved in both voluntary and sanction-induced norm compliance. Both types of compliance could be changed by varying the neural excitability of this brain region with transcranial direct current stimulation, but they were affected in opposite ways, suggesting that the stimulated region plays a fundamentally different role in voluntary and sanction-based compliance. Brain stimulation had a particularly strong effect on compliance in the context of socially constituted sanctions, whereas it left beliefs about what the norm prescribes and about subjectively expected sanctions unaffected. Our findings suggest that rLPFC activity is a key biological prerequisite for an evolutionarily and socially important aspect of human behavior.
Quelle: Ruff, C. C., Ugazio, G., & Fehr, E. (2013). Changing social norm compliance with noninvasive brain stimulation. Science, 342(6157), 482–484.
Link: http://science.sciencemag.org/content/342/6157/482.short